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This paper discusses some of the key characteristics of 
the U.S. subprime mortgage boom and bust, contrasts 
them with characteristics of emerging mortgage markets, 
and makes recommendations for emerging market policy 
makers. The crisis has raised questions in the minds of 
many as to the wisdom of extending mortgage lending 
to low and moderate income households. It is important 
to note, however, that prior to the growth of subprime 
lending in the 1990s, U.S. mortgage markets already 
reached low and moderate-income households without 
taking large risks or suffering large losses. In contrast, 
This paper—a product of the Global Capital Markets Non-Bank Financial Institutions Division, Financial and Private 
Sector Development Vice Presidency—is part of a larger effort in the department to promote stable and accessible housing 
finance systems in developing countries. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.
worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at wgwinner@worldbank.org.
in most emerging markets, mortgage finance is a luxury 
good, restricted to upper income households. As policy 
makers in emerging market seek to move lenders down 
market, they should adopt policies that include a variety 
of financing methods and should allow for rental or 
purchase as a function of the financial capacity of the 
household. Securitization remains a useful tool when 
developed in the context of well-aligned incentives and 
oversight. It is possible to extend mortgage lending down 
market without repeating the mistakes of the subprime 
boom and bust.  
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1. Weakened Lending Practices – Betting on the Collateral Rather than the 
Borrower 
Ten years of ballooning property prices led to excessive optimism by investors and 
lenders. In the U.S., depending on the index employed, national average house prices 
rose between 53 and 86 percent between the mid-1990s and 2006.
2 At the same time, 
mortgage originations rose by five times, peaking at $3.9 trillion in 2003 (Chart 1). 
Markets such as Los Angeles and New York have strongly outperformed the national 
average and many other cities. National indexes for real rents and house prices largely 
moved together until 2000, when they diverged, and real house prices moved to a level 
70 percent higher than that of real rents. Later, as the property balloon deflated in 2006 
and 2007, rising subprime defaults spurred a reevaluation of credit spreads and credit 
market conditions that reflected broader and more fundamental issues.
3 Apparently, 
individuals viewed real estate as a foolproof investment opportunity until they decided 
that it was not, at which point prices began to decline (André, et al., 2006, Shiller, 2007).  
                                                 
2 Shiller uses the Case-Shiller house price index, a repeat-sales index that samples properties from twenty 
metropolitan areas in the country, excluding several states. André, et  al. use the OFHEO house price index, 
which excludes higher priced properties, and samples from a much larger number of metropolitan areas. 
(Leventis, 2007). 
3 The economic stability in Europe and the U.S since the mid-1980s (falling GDP volatility, low inflation) 
has been termed the “great moderation.” It has been blamed in part for lowered credit risk spreads and 
persistent search for yield on the part of investors. (Bernanke 2004, Stock and Watson 2003). 
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Sources: S&P Case-Shiller, Inside Mortgage Finance
 
Subprime lending drove house price increases in some areas. Banks and investors act 
procyclically, extending credit more aggressively and competing for market share as 
collateral prices rise, when lending decisions seem less risky. Real estate cycles are 
lengthened by investor optimism during a boom and pessimism following its exhaustion. 
The current credit crunch is emblematic, with liquidity drying up and spreads widening 
dramatically on high quality prime mortgage-backed paper even though it continues to 
perform well. Booming real estate lending carries accelerator effects, and its cessation in 
a bust contributes to a more rapid slow down. Mian and Sufi (2008) show that mortgage 
credit underwriting standards were relaxed from 2001 to 2005 in zip codes with large 
numbers of high risk borrowers and negative relative income and employment growth. 
Relaxed standards were associated with increased mortgage lending, rising house prices, 
and a subsequent increase in defaults. 
Disaster myopia in sub-prime lending manifested itself in weakened underwriting 
standards, aggressive investor bids for above-market security yields, and an absence 
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of investor vetting of the collateral behind the securities.
4 As the U.S. real estate boom 
progressed during the 1990s, home buyers and bankers forgot the downturn of 1989 and 
1990, and real estate crises in other countries. More investors were attracted to residential 
real estate - the percent of mortgages issued for non-owner-occupied homes rose to 15 
percent in 2004 from the historically normal 5 percent (Morgan Stanley, 2005). In 
addition, lending to more risky borrowers grew, as subprime lending took off.
5   
Subprime ARMs seriously underperform other loan types (Chart 2).
 Serious 
delinquencies (90 days or more delinquent or in foreclosure) for all subprime loans fell 
from 2002 to the end of 2005, and then almost tripled, rising from 5.68 percent at third 
quarter 2005 to 14.44 percent at the end of 2007. In the same period, serious 
delinquencies for subprime ARMs quadrupled, from 5.15 percent to 20.43 percent. Prime 
fixed rate delinquencies remained stable at less than 1 percent until the end of 2006, and 
then rose to 1.67 percent at the end of 2007, perhaps reflecting the effects of house price 
declines on high loan-to-value (LTV) lending. Serious delinquencies for FHA-insured 
loans have risen, but to the same degree as subprime. Serious delinquencies of all FHA 
loans rose from 5.4 percent in the third quarter of 2005 to 6 percent at the end of 2007. 
Serious delinquencies for FHA ARMs almost doubled in the same period, from 4.87 
percent to 8.72 percent, but remain well below the level of subprime ARMs.  
                                                 
4 “Disaster myopia”, refers to the tendency of investors to forget bad events (Guttentag and Herring, 1984). 
As time passes after a shock (for example, house price declines, interest rate shocks, or widespread credit 
defaults), lenders and investors discount the likelihood of its recurrence, and then under-price risk. 
5 Although the definition of a subprime borrower varies from lender to lender, the following criteria capture 
most subprime borrowers: 1) a FICO (or credit) score of 660 or below, 2)  two or more 30-day delinquent 
payments in the past 12 months, or one 60-day delinquency in the past 24 months, 3) a foreclosure or 
charge-off in the past 24 months, 4) any bankruptcy in the last 60 months, 5) qualifying debt-to-income 
ratios of 50 percent or higher, 6) limited ability to cover monthly living expenses. 
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The primary cause of subprime ARM defaults has been weak underwriting., in 
large part by non-bank lenders. Between 40 and 50 percent of subprime loans were 
made by independent non-bank lenders between 2004 and 2006 (Avery, et al 2007). Non-
bank lenders such as New Century Financial aggressively pursued the “originate to 
distribute business model,” where it originated loans for sale to the capital markets.  
Founded in 1995, by the end of 2006 New Century was the third largest subprime lender 
in the country, with loan production that year of $51.6 billion. New Century filed for 
bankruptcy protection in April, 2007, primarily as a result of insufficient capital to satisfy 
demands from investors to repurchase defaulted and deficient mortgages. According to 
the bankruptcy court examiner, New Century had a “brazen obsession with increasing 
loan originations without due regard to the risks associated with that business strategy.” 
The primary consideration for loan quality was the ability to sell in the secondary market. 
More than 70 percent of loans originated by the company had low initial teaser rates, and 
40 percent were underwritten on a stated income basis. New Century made frequent 
exceptions to its underwriting guidelines for borrowers who might not otherwise qualify 
for a loan. Early payment defaults, a sure sign of weak underwriting, rose from 4.38 
percent of loans made in 2003 to 13.1 percent of loans in early 2007.
6 (Missal, 2008). 
                                                 
66 An early payment default is defined as a default on a loan in any of the first three months of its life. 
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Alternative mortgage designs can be dangerous to the financial system.  Subprime 
borrowers, those with poor credit records, a history of bankruptcy, or who are 
overextended on their credit, often selected mortgage products that are not typical of 
prime borrowers that have stronger credit records. Prime borrowers typically choose 
standard, long-term, fixed-rate, mortgages and make a down payment of 20 percent or 
more. Historically, roughly 80 percent of prime originations have been fixed rate in any 
given year, and about 20 percent have been ARMs. Subprime borrowers often made low 
down payments (between zero and 10 percent) and chose riskier loan products, including: 
• “option” mortgages, which allow borrowers to defer some of their payments but 
which also result in increasing loan balances, also known as negative amortization 
mortgages, 
• “convertible” mortgages, which start with fixed rates, then convert to adjustable 
rates at a pre-specified reset date, 
• “low documentation / no documentation” mortgages, where the borrower 
provides no or minimal documentation on employment, income, etc. 
Given the recent failure of IndyMac, an Alt-A lender in Southern California, increased 
attention is likely to be given to Alt-A, no documentation or low documentation lending 
since these are inherently risky and susceptible to downturns in national and local 
housing markets.
7  
So far, neither subprime ARM “teaser” interest rates nor subsequent rate 
adjustments appear to have been a primary driver of defaults. One of the more risky 
products during the subprime boom has been hybrid ARMs that feature an initial fixed 
teaser rate for two or three years, and that then adjust to a variable rate that is linked to a 
capital market benchmark such as the one year Treasury bill, with a spread. As these 
loans feature thirty year amortization schedules, they are known as 2/28 or 3/27 loans. 
Foote, et al (2008) show that the initial teaser rate on 2/28 ARMs averaged from 7.3 
percent in 2004 to 8.6 percent in 2007, with an average spread of about 3 percent over the 
one year prime ARM rate. The fully-indexed rate fell from 11.5 percent in 2004 to 9.1 
percent in 2007. The bulk of subprime ARMs were expected to reset in 2007 and 2008. 
(Center for Responsible Lending  2008). Interest rate cuts by the Federal Reserve in 2008 
have muted to some extent the effects of this wave of adjustments. Demyanyk and Van 
Hemert (2007) show that most subprime ARM defaults have occured before the loans 
reach their first adjustment date, highlighting the prevalence of weak underwriting rather 
than the impact of rate adjustments.  
Changing market conditions and the prevalence of prepayment penalties have 
curtailed the ability of borrowers to refinance before teaser interest rates expire. 
Many borrowers took out subprime ARMs with the intention of exploiting house price 
increases and refinancing before the end of the teaser period. High prepayment rates have 
been prevalent on subprime ARMs. Foote, et al (2008) show that up to 60 percent of the 
                                                 
7 Alt-A loans are extended to borrowers whose credit scores fall short of prime but are believed to be above 
levels associated with subprime lending. 
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subprime cohorts from 2001 to 2004 prepaid at or before 24 months of loan life.  
Prepayments for the 2005 and 2006 cohorts slowed dramatically, to about a 50 percent 
cumulative rate before 24 months for the 2005 cohort, and slower still at 20 months for 
the 2006 cohort. Declining house prices are inhibiting the ability of highly leveraged 
2005 and 2006 borrowers to refinance. Also, an estimated 70 percent of subprime loans 
carry prepayment penalties as opposed to 2 percent of prime loans (Berson, 2006, Center 
for Responsible Lending, 2008). 
Geographic concentration of subprime lending has increased loss severity. Agarwal, 
et al (2008) find that subprime loans tend to be concentrated geographically. In their 
study of the Phoenix, Arizona area, they find that subprime loans are found in primarily 
older neighborhoods in the inner city. As foreclosures surge in these older 
neighborhoods, they find that house prices decline more than in neighborhoods (or zip 
codes) with higher concentrations of prime loans. Thus, it is important to understand that 
high-risk lending in geographically concentrated areas can result in “default cascades” 
where they decline in property value can contribute to the decline in neighboring property 
values and increasing loss severities in these neighborhoods. 
As house prices have fallen and interest rates risen, subprime defaults and 
foreclosures have risen more than expected, but not necessarily because of ruthless 
defaults.  As highly leveraged borrowers find themselves with mortgage debt greater 
than the value of their homes, it is to be expected that many would “ruthlessly” default, 
leave the lender with the cost of disposing the property, and accept the damage to their 
credit records. Foote, et al (2008) show that the issue with falling house prices stems 
from the resulting vulnerability to personal financial shocks rather than the tendency to 
ruthlessly default. Households that have positive equity can sell or refinance, but those 
with negative equity and a personal financial shock such as job loss are more likely to be 
forced into foreclosure.  
Sixty percent of vintage 2006 subprime loans were made on a “stated income” basis, 
without any documentation or verification of the income of the borrower (Fitch, 
2007). In considering the debt to income ratio, it is standard practice to verify the loan 
applicant’s income with evidence such as pay stubs, direct verification by employer, or 
tax returns. In emerging markets, informal borrowers may submit rent receipts, utility 
bills, payoffs of appliance loans, or contracted savings accounts. Less polite industry 
terms for stated income loans included “no doc,” “low doc,” or “liar loans.” While 
convenient for the borrower, such loans carry spreads of up to 500 basis points above 
prime lending rates. Stated income loans can make sense when the lender verifies assets 
and employment, and when the borrower has significant cash equity in the transaction. 
Historically, stated income loans have been made in limited numbers for self-employed 
professionals, or to refinance existing loans held by the lender. The lender could save 
time when it was familiar with the property, comfortable with the LTV of the new loan 
and with its knowledge of the borrower’s willingness and ability to pay. However, stated 
income lending became more widespread in the industry and it became riskier as lenders 
offered such loans on the expectation of rising house prices and without verifying assets. 
Studies cited by the OCC showed that borrowers exaggerated their income on 90 percent 
of surveyed stated income loans, that most incomes were exaggerated by more than 50 
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percent, and that many lenders and mortgage brokers were aware that the borrower 
lacked the income to pay the loan (Dugan, 2007).  
Stated income loans have performed worse than other subprime loans. According to 
rating agency analysis, 67 percent of early payment defaults for the 2007 vintage were 
low or no documentation loans (Fitch, 2007). Now that attention is focused on rising 
subprime defaults, and regulators like the OCC have begun to pay more attention, many 
lenders have stopped offering stated income loans. 
Higher LTV and debt-to-income (DTI) ratios were accepted for both prime and 
subprime loans. LTVs rose in two respects: 1) higher LTVs accepted at purchase, and 2) 
equity extracted by refinancing an appreciated house. Mian and Sufi (2008) found that 
LTVs and DTI ratios rose substantially in the early 2000s. Foote, et al (2008) found that 
in New England, for borrowers with FICO scores less than 620, LTV ratios on purchase 
and refinance loans rose from 82 percent in 1999 and 2000 to 92 percent in 2005 and 
2006. DTIs for similar borrowers rose from 36 percent in 1999-2000 to 43 percent in 
2005-2006. For high FICO scores, average LTVs rose to almost 95 percent, and DTIs 
rose from 36 percent to 42 percent.  
At time of purchase, lenders accepted increasingly higher LTVs, including the 
possibility of financing 100 percent or more of the house price with a straight first 
lien, or with simultaneous first and second lien mortgages, known as “piggyback” 
loans. More traditionally, mortgages with LTVs greater than 80 percent have been made 
available only with mortgage default insurance. Piggybacks enabled borrowers to avoid 
paying for mortgage insurance, and until 2006 provided a tax advantage since interest on 
the second lien was tax deductible, but the MI premium was not. Piggybacks made up 
more than 35 percent of subprime originations in 2006 (Fitch, 2007).
8 Calhoun (2005) 
documents reporting and risk issues with piggyback lending. These include regional 
concentrations of piggyback lending to improve affordability. Overall, higher LTV levels 
and debt burdens coupled with subsequently falling house prices and employment losses 
created a greater probability of negative equity and default.  
Many foreclosed borrowers put little money down and had lived for a short time in 
their homes. Foote, et al (2008) report that in New England in 2007, 40 percent of 
foreclosures were of mortgages with zero down payments, and that 40 percent had owned 
their homes for less than three years. Since in Massachusetts, foreclosure usually takes 6 
months or more, most recent foreclosed borrowers spent little time in their homes before 
financial problems occurred. In the current downturn in New England, house prices have 
fallen 12 percent between the first quarter of 2006 and the first quarter of 2008. During 
this period, unemployment has fallen 0.4 percent, so financial pressure on owners 
remains muted. 
Many foreclosures have been for subprime loans to formerly prime borrowers. 
Foote, et al (2008) show that 70 percent of homes lost to foreclosure in 2006 and 2007 in 
Massachusetts were initially purchased with prime loans, but 45.2 percent of defaulted 
                                                 
8 See below for a discussion of tax incentives for home ownership. 
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mortgages were subprime. The 45.2 percent is higher than 30 percent because many 
borrowers who purchased homes with prime loans later refinanced into subprime and 
then defaulted.  
Private and public mortgage insurance (MI) lost market share as a method of credit 
risk mitigation for lower income borrowers and for borrowers that make low down 
payments (Chart 3). MI plays several constructive roles in the mortgage market. First, it 
indemnifies lenders and investors against default by high LTV borrowers. In so doing, it 
contributes to access to finance for buyers that lack the savings for a 20 percent down 
payment. By indemnifying against loss and acting as a separate source of capital in 
severe economic downturns, MI contributes to financial system stability. To be eligible 
for MI, a lender has to adhere to the mortgage insurer’s standards for credit underwriting 
and management, and so MI providers are important in establishing such standards. MI 
providers play a part in maintaining credit standards, because they monitor the loans that 
they insure. During the subprime boom, loans backed by private MI fell from 17 percent 
of originations in 1995 to 9 percent in 2006, even as average LTVs rose. The market 
share for FHA and VA-insured loans fell much further, from 18 percent of originations in 
1994 to 3 percent in 2006. As the boom ended, private MI market share has risen again, 
reaching 15 percent of originations at the end of March, 2008. The Federal government 
has turned to the FHA to refinance loans for troubled subprime borrowers, and its market 
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Better underwriting and more effective loss mitigation in difficult times have caused 
loans with FHA insurance to outperform subprime loans to households with similar 
incomes. At the end of December, 2007, 14.4 percent of all subprime loans and 20.4 
percent of subprime ARMs were seriously delinquent. At that time, 6.0 percent of all 
FHA loans and 8.72 percent of FHA ARMs were seriously delinquent (MBA, 2008). 
Likewise, in the states most affected by subprime defaults, the delinquency rate for FHA 
loans was substantially lower.
9 
The extension of subprime lending was supported in part by the increased use of 
credit scores without adjusting models and assumptions to reflect changing market 
conditions. Econometric models permit lenders to adjust the price of loans to reflect the 
expected and unexpected risk of making loans to lower and moderate income borrowers. 
Improved risk-based pricing has been a boon to the financial industry overall, and reflects 
industry best practice for financial risk management. However, in the case of subprime 
lending, default models have not kept up with the evolving market, and so subprime 
default rates have surprised investors and lenders. The models particularly seemed to 
have missed the growing likelihood of default that resulted from the rise in interest rates 
that began in 2005, the slowdown in house price appreciation that started in some 
markets in 2005 and gained momentum in 2006 and 2007, and loosened underwriting 
standards (Jaffee 2008, President’s Working Group 2008).  
The layering of separate risks has compounded analytic errors and led to 
unexpected levels of defaults. In addition to the weakness of scoring models for the 
separate elements as discussed above (stated income, high LTV, house price declines), 
the combination of these elements has proved to be an issue in the subprime crisis. If 
loans that lack income documentation are risky, then the same loans made at 100 percent 
LTV in a market that now sees falling prices are bound to be riskier still. The rating 
agencies have admitted that they failed to model the impact of layering one risk on 
another.  
 
2. The Subprime Boom and Access to Finance  
U.S. Housing Finance Priorities 
Before subprime lending grew, U.S. mortgage lenders reached the majority of 
households, and the overall housing system delivered high quality shelter to 98 
percent of households. Economic growth, a relatively elastic supply of land, and the 
public and private financial institutions created during the 1930s laid the foundation for a 
market that delivers high quality shelter to more than 98 percent of households. When the 
                                                 
9 This comparison would be more accurate were annual cohorts of FHA-insured mortgages compared with 
cohorts of subprime mortgages with similar credit risk characteristics, such as LTV, debt-to-income ratio, 
borrower income level, geographic location, etc. However, it is clear that weak subprime underwriting has 
led to higher defaults by moderate and lower income households that FHA has lent to with greater success. 
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New Deal housing finance institutions were created in the 1930s,
10 much of the housing 
stock was substandard, with one-third of housing units lacking sewage attachments, and 
20 percent overcrowded. By 2000, only 1.1 percent of the U.S. housing stock lacked 
sewage hookups, even though 9.8 percent of households lived in poverty (Census, 2006). 
Access to financial services is widespread; between 85 and 90 percent of households 
have bank accounts; the majority of unbanked households are recent immigrants (Barr 
2001, Caskey, et al 2006). In recent years, about 40 percent of conventional
11 mortgages 
were made to households earning less than the median household income, 64 percent of 
FHA or VA-insured loans were made to households earning less than the median, and 
overall, half of homeowners earn less than the median.
12 
U.S. housing policy has prioritized access to owner-occupied housing by increasing 
the supply of finance and by providing tax subsidies.
13 New Deal housing finance 
institutions such as FHA and Fannie Mae are predominately oriented to increasing and 
stabilizing financing for owner-occupied single-family homes, originally by providing 
long term mortgages. Home ownership is further subsidized by tax benefits. These 
policies, along with the post-World War II economic boom, succeeded in spurring 
homeownership and housing quality. Garriga, et al., (2007) estimate that about half of the 
increase in home ownership during the 1950s and 1960s can be explained by the 
introduction of the 30 year fixed rate mortgage and that the more recent increase can be 
attributed to the acceptance of smaller down payments. The home ownership rate rose 
from 43.6 percent in 1940 to 61.9 percent in 1960, and peaked at 69.1 percent in the first 
quarter of 2005.  
U.S. tax subsidies for home ownership distort investment, but are strongly 
supported by the building and finance industries. Fiscal benefits for ownership 
include: the tax deductibility of mortgage interest paid on first and second lien loans on 
primary and secondary homes (maximum total indebtedness of US$1 million); deduction 
from Federal income taxes of local real estate taxes paid; and since 2006, deduction of 
mortgage default insurance premiums (GAO, 2005, Garriga, et al., 2007). Economists 
widely agree that the fiscal benefits of homeownership have steered investment away 
from more productive uses (GAO, 2005). Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) argue that the 
mortgage interest tax deduction does not increase home ownership, rather it encourages 
existing owners to invest in larger and more expensive homes. Housing industry 
participants have strongly supported the continuation of tax policies that favor ownership, 
including the National Association of Realtors, the National Association of Home 
Builders, and Fannie Mae.
14 
                                                 
10 These institutions included the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Fannie Mae, the Federal Home 
Loan Banks, and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. In the 1930s and 1940s, the FHA 
played a central role in improving quality by setting minimum construction standards for the houses that 
collateralized mortgages that it insured. 
11 Conventional signifies loans that carry neither FHA credit insurance nor a VA guarantee. 
12 Sources: HMDA data, author calculation, and Census  (2008). 
13 Access to ownership of a high quality, single family stand-alone house is a central focus of the U.S. 
housing policy dialogue. Since almost the entire housing stock meets construction standards, the driving 
determinants of ownership are the cost of urban land, required down payment, and the cost of financing. 
14 See their web sites for policy statements and executive’s speeches: www.fanniemae.com, www.nar.org, 
www.nahb.org  
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U.S. tax subsidies for home ownership are regressive, particularly in comparison to 
rental subsidies. Given the progressivity of the Federal income tax, mortgage deductions 
have no value for low income households and little value to moderate income owners.
15 
In 2005 the total mortgage interest tax deduction claimed amounted to US$340.5 billion 
(IRS, 2007a). By contrast, the major tax subsidy that supports the creation of new low-
cost rental units, the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) cost the government 
about US$5.1 billion in tax expenditures in 2007 (NLIHC, 2008). While almost 50 
percent of homeowner households earn less than the median income, 80 percent of renter 
households earn less than the median (Census, 2006). 
A distortion in tax policy contributed to the growth of riskier mortgage lending 
during the subprime boom. Until 2006, the interest paid on a second lien mortgage loan 
was deductible from Federal income tax, but the premium paid for mortgage default 
insurance was not. This disparity provided an incentive to individuals to finance 100 
percent of the purchase price of a house with the combination of an 80 percent first lien 
mortgage and a simultaneous 20 percent “piggyback” second lien, as discussed earlier in 
this paper. The popularity of piggyback house purchases resulted in higher levels of 
indebtedness, and given subsequently falling house prices, a greater chance for negative 
equity. Starting in 2006, buyers were permitted to deduct from Federal taxes the 
mortgage insurance premium paid in connection with home acquisition debt (IRSc 2007). 
Once borrowers were able to deduct the MI premium, market share for MI providers 
began to rebound from years of decline.  
The Links Between Subprime Lending and Access to Finance 
Subprime lending has provided only limited access to finance. More than half of 
subprime loans have been for refinancing existing mortgages rather than purchasing a 
house (Chart 4). In the U.S., individuals frequently replace existing fixed rate mortgages 
with new ones to take advantage of declines in market rates or to extract equity from the 
house by refinancing at a higher LTV. Many subprime borrowers refinanced to pay off 
riskier ARM loans before they reached the end of their low teaser interest rate period. As 
such, refinancing represents no new access to finance. In addition, not all subprime 
lending has been for low-income households; many subprime loans were made to higher 
income earners that had blemished credit records.  
 
                                                 
15 Federal tax exemptions are available only to taxpayers who file itemized returns, where they itemize, or 
list separate deductions to reduce the tax paid. These include mortgage interest paid, moving expenses, 
medical expenses, charitable contributions, and a host of other expenses. To make itemization worthwhile, 
the reduction in taxes has to compensate for the extra effort of filing a more complicated itemized return. In 
2005, 35.5 percent of taxpayers itemized, and 11.8 percent of these earned less than the median household 
income. Interest paid on mortgages represented one of the largest categories of exemptions, 32.8 percent of 
total deductions taken (IRS, 2007). 
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Chart 4 



















































Subprime mortgage lending was made possible by liberalization of the financial 
system, new credit risk management technology, and policy efforts to reduce racial 
and economic discrimination in lending. In 1980, Congress passed the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA), the first of a series of 
laws that liberalized the financial system.. DIDMCA did many things, among them 
ending usury restrictions on mortgage interest rate (Gramlich, 2007). The second 
ingredient, credit scoring technology, came into being in the 1990s, as banks became 
aware of the power of historical statistics in predicting credit performance. The third 
ingredient was an effort to increase the supply of credit to underserved communities, the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977.
16 CRA requires banks to provide credit, 
including mortgages, to all communities in the geographical areas that they serve, 
including those that are predominately minority and low income.  
In the 1990s, lenders came to realize that lending in low-income neighborhoods was 
profitable, so long as they could charge an interest rate that was sufficient to 
compensate for the risk of lower credit scores. As CRA required banks to lend more in 
                                                 
16 For an overview of CRA, see the Federal Reserve Board’s website: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/dcca/cra/ 
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low income neighborhoods, banks did so using credit scoring to evaluate ability and 
willingness to pay, and to charge higher rates of interest to clients that credit scores 
showed to be riskier. Prior to the 1990s, mortgage lending had been characterized by 
uniform pricing among individuals for a given loan type. During the 1990s, credit scoring 
gave lenders an objective means to price discriminate on the basis of credit risk. 
Consumer lending, and particularly mortgage lending, evolved to where many individuals 
that previously were denied credit were now granted credit, but at prices that varied with 
their credit scores (Avery, et al., 2007, Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross, 2006, 
Gramlich, 2007).  
The role of subprime lending in raising the ownership rate is not clear and its 
sustainability is questionable. Data limitations make it difficult to determine how many 
first time homebuyers gained access to mortgage credit for the first time thanks to 
subprime lending. Jaffee (2008) estimates that subprime lending may have enabled 1.38 
million first time home purchases nationwide between 2000 and 2007. This would be 
about 20 percent of the increase of 6.59 million owners over the same period or 1.8 
percent of the 75.1 million overall owner-occupied units in the country in 2006.
17 To the 
degree that first time buyers subprime had high LTVs and now are in negative equity 
positions, or have loans with high debt-to-income ratios, and teaser rates that have 
adjusted radically higher, the addition to ownership is likely to prove short lived. The 
Center for Responsible Lending has estimated that over 2 million subprime loans will 
eventually end up in foreclosure. If this turns out to be the case, then the net effect of 
subprime lending on homeownership would be negative.  
The U.S. home ownership rate rose moderately between the 1980s and 2006, 
including the years of the subprime boom, then fell somewhat. By the first quarter of 
2008, the overall ownership rate had dropped to 67.8 percent from its 2005 peak of 69.1 
percent, a drop of 1.44 million units, given the occupied stock of 110.8 million occupied 
units at the end of April, 2008 (Census, 2008). 
The current U.S. home ownership rate is among the higher of Western European 
countries with equally sophisticated mortgage finance systems. Ownership rates in 
Western Europe range between 45 and 82 percent (Table 1). Ownership in many 
emerging markets ranges between 70 and 85 percent, reflecting in some cases weaker 
forms of tenure and lower quality units (South America), and in others massive and 
sometimes costless privatization of the formerly public housing stock (Eastern Europe).  
 
Table 1 Selected Home Ownership Rates 
Country  Home Ownership Rate*
Germany 45 
Denmark 49 
                                                 
17 The 6.59 increase is the gross increase in the number of all types of owners, not just first-time owner-
occupiers.   
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United Kingdom  69 
Spain 82 
Latvia 77 




Figures for Europe are for 2004, for Latin America for 2000 
Source: Federcasa (2006), Torche and Spilerman (2007) 
The U.S. national homeownership rate may never rise much higher than 75 percent.  
Regional disparities in ownership rates reflect differing housing costs, with ownership 
levels somewhat higher in the Midwest (72 percent) and South (69.7 percent) than the 
Northeast (64.7 percent). Disparities between age groups reflect life cycle factors, with 
ownership rates higher for older households that would be expected to have saved more 
and to be more settled. Ownership levels within age groups have been relatively steady 
for some time. For example, the rate for owners under 35 was 39 percent in 1985, rose to 
43 percent in 2003, and dropped to 41.3 percent in the first quarter of 2008. It may be that 
access to lower down payment loans has made ownership available to as many younger 
households as can afford to buy or that want to (Census, 2008, 1999, Garriga, et al., 
2007).  The greatest remaining disparity is with respect to race, which reflects differences 
in income among racial groups and, to a lesser extent than in the past, discrimination.
18 
The ownership rate for Blacks rose from 46.3 percent in 2000 to 48.1 percent in 2005, 
and then fell to 47.1 percent in the first quarter of 2008. The Hispanic ownership rate rose 
from 45.7 percent in 2000, to 49.4 percent in 2005, and then fell to 48.9 percent in 2008. 
Median household income for Blacks was 61 percent that of whites in 2006, and that of 
Hispanics was 72 percent that of Whites (Census, 2008). Income disparities between 
racial groups narrowed between the 1960s and 1990s, and ownership rates among 
minority groups rose during that period. If incomes and ownership rates among Blacks 
and Hispanics were to rise to the level of White-headed households, the overall 
ownership rate would rise to 75 percent.  
 
3. Weaknesses in Secondary Market Practices  
Between 2001 and 2006, between 60 and 80 percent of subprime loans were bundled into 
mortgage-backed securities and sold to investors in capital markets (Inside Mortage 
                                                 
18 In the 1930s the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) explicitly referred to African Americans and other 
minority groups as adverse influences, and many lenders and insurers openly discriminated until such 
practices were outlawed by in 1968 by a Supreme Court decision and by the 1968 Fair Housing Act. The 
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 required banks to offer products to previously underserved 
neighborhoods. Prosecutions of racial discrimination in lending continue under the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act. See Hillier (2003), Department of Justice (2008). 
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Finance, 2008). This is in contrast with the bank lending model followed in most 
emerging markets, where banks originate and hold the loans in their portfolios, fund them 
with deposits and retain the risk of default. Securitization in the U.S. has clear benefits 
because it taps the bond market, which is less expensive on a risk-adjusted basis than 
funding with deposits. Securitization permits banks more flexibility in managing capital 
allocation as they are able to monetize long maturity assets and sell credit risk to the 
capital market. 
 
Increased Moral Hazard Problems 
Securitization comes at a cost, which is that there is a risk of moral hazard. Lenders 
that originate then sell the loans to another party (investors) have incentives to originate 
and sell loans that are riskier than they would originate if they had to hold them in their 
portfolios. For securitization to work properly there must be a means to control moral 
hazard. This could be through a third party agent, such as a credit rating agency (CRA) or 
through a contractual arrangement, such as requiring lenders that sell portfolios to retain 
capital against the performance of the portfolio, or to retain a subordinated portion of the 
security that is eventually issued. When the moral hazard problem is not controlled and 
defaults rise above what has been expected, investors are exposed to additional 
unexpected risks.  
What are the moral hazard problems with the securitization market? The basic structure 
of the U.S. residential mortgage securitization market is found in Figure 1. Essentially, a 
lender makes the loan to a borrower based on an evaluation of the borrower’s credit risk. 
The lender then sells the loan to a third party (aggregator) that bundles it with other 
mortgages and issue bonds based on the cash flow of the entire assembled loan portfolio. 
Federal government sponsored enterprises (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac) buy most 
conforming loans (loan amount of $350,000 and excellent borrower credit). Investment 
banks buy loans over the conforming limit (jumbo loans) and they buy credit impaired or 
subprime mortgages. The jumbo and subprime markets together are termed the “private 
label” or nonagency market.
19 The investment bank bundles the loans into a pool and 
then underwrites the pool and sells bonds (or tranches) based on the pool to investors. At 
each point in the process, the investor is relying on the underwriters to have properly 
underwritten the loans and the pool of loans. Given that the lender has the option to retain 
loans for the bank’s portfolio, one must consider whether the lender has sold the lower 
quality loans to investors through the securitization markets. In other words, did the 
lender sell its “lemons” to investors.
20 
                                                 
19 See Bruskin, Sanders and Sykes , "The Nonagency Mortgage Market:Background and Overview" The 
Handbook of Nonagency  Mortgage-backed Securities, edited by Frank J. Fabozzi, Chuck Ramsey and 
Michael Marz, 2000  
20 See Akerlof for a discussion of asymmetric information and markets for lemons. 






Market disclosures and contractual constraints failed to prevent weak practices in 
subprime underwriting. Contractual representations and warranties in securitization 
documents require that the loan originator repurchase or make whole the investor for 
mortgage loans that were not made according to what was promised by the lender. That 
is, if investors (or another party) discover that the loans were inappropriate or that 
underwriting was not sufficient, the investors can require that the lender repurchase the 
tainted loans.  Typically, the offering memorandum for a subprime asset-backed security 
deal will convey these representations and warranties that supposedly protect investors 
from poor origination and underwriting by the lender. The mortgage loan purchase 
agreement (MLPA) details the representations and warranties covering the lender’s 
origination and underwriting. While this seems sufficient to overcome the potential moral 
hazard problems associated with the lender, there are two problems associated with 
relying on representations and warranties to solve the moral hazard problem. First, the 
lender can challenge the claims in court and such cases may last several years. Second, 
lenders like New Century Financial did not maintain sufficient capital to cover all claims. 
Since lenders can file for bankruptcy protection, the lender will in practice tolerate only a 
certain level of repurchase claims. In practice, many lightly capitalized subprime 
mortgage lenders were bankrupted in 2006 and 2007 because they lacked the funds to 
make good on investor claims to repurchase early defaulting loans out of the pools. Thus, 
the representations and warranties requiring lenders to repurchase tainted loans may not 
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be an effective tool in a default wave such as has been occurring in the U.S. during 2007 
and 2008. 
 
Not Fully Understanding B/C Lending 
The desire for issuance volume and yield led lenders, securitization conduits, and 
investors down market. When interest rates increased dramatically in 1994, mortgage 
originators sought ways to offset the dramatic drop in refinancing applications. In their 
search to preserve market share and fully utilize existing servicing capability when loan 
originations slow down, lenders sought to identify borrowers who were previously 
undetected, underserved, or underqualified. Conforming loan MBS (such as Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac MBS) tend to refinance rapidly when interest rates drop. Therefore, to 
insulate investors against faster prepayments, investment banks sought to purchase loan 
types that were known to prepay more slowly, such as subprime. Many originators 
broadened their market base by developing or expanding not only the subprime (also 
known as B/C) credit programs but "alternative" A-credit borrowers that did not fit either 
the agency-conforming or standard jumbo underwriting criteria.   
Assumptions about the performance of subprime borrowers and securities proved 
to be inaccurate. B/C borrowers generally accept mortgage loans with high interest rates 
because they cannot qualify for anything else at the time of loan origination, and their 
loan amounts are typically lower than for A-quality loans. Thus, these borrowers are 
expected to be less sensitive to interest rates because of the restricted opportunities to 
refinance and the limited dollar reduction in their debt service. In addition, subprime 
loans typically have prepayment penalties while conforming loans do not. On the other 
hand, overall B/C prepayment speeds are inherently fast because these borrowers are 
motivated to refinance into an A-quality loan as soon as their credit position improves.  
Under these prepayment assumptions, securities backed by B/C loans should be shorter 
and yet less callable — precisely the characteristics sought by many ABS investors.  
However, these assumptions were untested by experience, and could unravel, as 
conforming MBS assumptions did, if subsequent product innovation provided appealing 
alternative financing for credit-impaired borrowers.
21 
In the jumbo loan sector, borrowers that fail to satisfy one or more of the standard 
credit underwriting guidelines were seen as a good underserved market to address, 
in conjunction with property-based lending. In the 1990s, these borrowers were 
attracted to the limited documentation (“limited doc”) or no documentation (“no doc”) 
programs in which the lenders waived most of the documentation required to demonstrate 
the borrower's financial strength (in other words, “don’t ask, don't tell”) in return for a 
large down payment. “No doc” programs were also known as “equity lending” because 
the loan quality depended entirely on the value of the underlying real estate. Lenders 
believed that increased borrower equity would reduce the probability of default and 
mitigate losses in the actual event of default.
22 
                                                 
21 Recently, subprime prepayments have slowed dramatically compared to those before the housing market 
slowdown and subprime delinquency/default spike. 
22 See A. Davidson, A. Sanders, L, Wolff and A. Ching, Securitization, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
2003), Chapter 16. 
      18      
Unfortunately, lenders miscalculated. “Limited doc” loans rapidly became the worst-
performing sector of the nonagency MBS market.
23 The most spectacular failures were 
due to borrower fraud, particularly fraudulent appraisals (which misrepresented the LTV 
ratio) and "silent second" mortgages (i.e., second mortgages taken out simultaneously 
with the first mortgage, unbeknownst to the first lien mortgage lender, thus 
misrepresenting borrowers’ debt ratios and equity contribution). However, even 
mainstream lenders experienced much higher-than-anticipated losses on their limited doc 
portfolios, for several reasons: 
a.  Adverse selection: The near-total lack of borrower disclosure attracted genuinely 
weak borrowers, rather than creditworthy ones who failed to qualify on a 
technicality.
24 
b.  Payment-induced borrower default: Most limited doc loans were ARMs because 
they were more likely to have to remain in the lender's portfolio; and the 
combination of deep teaser rates and rising interest rates caused payments to 
increase dramatically through the late 1980s.
25 
c.  Vanishing equity: When the real estate market turned sour, prices on distressed 
properties dropped much faster than the overall average, which rapidly deflated 
the equity cushion.
26 
d.  Search for additional volume: Originators and investors, seeking to retain and 
grow profitable fee-based business volume moved progressively down market to 
ever less-qualified borrowers. 
 
Not Understanding New Mortgage Designs  
Investors in the subprime and jumbo markets  lacked data to evaluate the 
performance of new mortgage instruments such as option ARMs, 2/28 ARMs, and 
others.
27 These newer loan instruments cannot be evaluated with data for other loan 
designs in rising property markets. It has been suggested that loans with adjustable rates 
are a big part of the problem, but such loans are not new. Adjustable rate mortgages have 
been a part of the U.S. market for some time, but more to the point, they have been the 
main type of mortgage in countries like Canada and the U.K. for some time without 
major disruption. What was unknown (due to a heavy reliance on historical data) was 
how a slowdown or turndown in the housing market would affect defaults of ARMs with 
                                                 
23 “Mortgage Defaults Start to Spread: New Data Show That Nontraditional Loans Are Beginning To 
Haunt Borrowers With Midlevel Credit; Prime Still Fine,”  Wall Street Journal, March 1, 2007; Page D1 
24 “What is ALT- A… Anyway?” Andrew Davidson Company, September 2004,  http://www.ad-
co.com/newsletter/Sept04/Sept04.htm 
25 “Defaults on Some `Alt A' Loans Surpass Subprime Ones,” Bloomberg News, July 24, 2007 
26 “Pimco Says Subprime Woes May Spread to Alt-A, Jumbo (Update1),”  Bloomberg News, March 16, 
2007. 
27 An adjustable-rate mortgage that allows the borrower to choose among several payment options each 
month. The options typically include: 1) a traditional payment of principal and interest based on a set loan 
term; 2) an interest-only payment; and 3)  a minimum (or limited) payment which may be less than the 
amount of interest due that month and may not pay down any principal. Borrowers that make limited 
payments may incur negative amortization of principal.  
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new and complex features as they were extended to a broader population of households, 
many with more limited resources.   
Data from Loanperformance.com shows that there has been a sharp increase in late 
payments among recently originated (2006) subprime loans, but these increases have 
been well before rate changes would take place Demyanyk and Van Hemert
 (2007). So at 
least some of blame is due to other characteristics of the loans and/or borrowers. It will 
take months or years before it is known which characteristics have been the most 
important. 
 
Not Fully Recognizing the Adverse Selection Problem 
There is evidence that a number of borrowers gave misleading information about 
their income and operated under the assumption that they could refinance their way 
out of problems. When housing prices started declining, they discovered that this was 
more difficult than expected. That so many loans have been delinquent almost 
immediately after origination suggests that not all borrowers have been victims. In some 
cases, the borrowers went along with deceptive schemes to fool the underwriter (and loan 
purchaser). 
There is evidence that a number of borrowers took out loans knowing in advance 
that they could not afford the mortgage payments when an ARM reset took place. 
These borrowers were effectively speculating on housing prices, hoping for an increase in 
housing values so that they could sell their properties for a gain before the reset occurred.  
More broadly, there were plenty of incentives for borrowers, lenders, and investors 
to have protected themselves. While it may be the case that investors in the AAA 
tranches of subprime structures had little incentive to look closely at risks, the investors 
in the subordinated tranches certainly had such an incentive. It looks like they will bear 
the brunt of losses, and it is unclear so far why they, who were supposed to be the 
specialists in risk management, were so wrong.  
Not Fully Understanding the Shortcomings of Credit Rating Agencies 
Credit Rating Agency models were misapplied. The credit rating agencies (CRAs) 
(Moody’s, S&P, Fitch) provide ratings for credit-sensitive products such as subprime 
Asset-backed Securities (ABS). Investors around the world rely on the ratings agencies’ 
assessment of risk for the underlying collateral and the structure of the ABS tranches. 
Unfortunately, the ratings agencies were delayed in downgrading the ratings on ABS 
tranches, waiting until after the problems had already begun.
28 A partial explanation for 
the ratings agencies being slow to react to the deteriorating credit conditions in the 
subprime market is that their risk models are historically based. Subprime defaults during 
2004-2006 were low and house prices were increasing (given little incentive for subprime 
borrowers to default). However, the slowdown and decline of house prices led to a 
                                                 
28 “Stopping the Subprime Crisis,” New York Times, July 25, 2007. 
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sudden increase in delinquencies and defaults in the subprime sector. So, it is not 
surprising that historically-based ratings would take a while to adjust to the downturn.  
In addition to being slow to downgrade subprime ABS, the ratings agencies may 
also suffer from the incentive structure inherent in their business model. Issuing 
investment banks pay the rating agencies to analyze and rate the collateral underlying 
credit sensitive MBS and ABS. Two ratings are typically used. Given that there are more 
than two rating agencies, a potential problem surfaces when the issuing investment banks 
pay for the ratings, in that a ratings agency could give favorable ratings in return for 
repeat business. However, the incentive for ratings agencies to be overly generous with 
their ratings must be offset by the reputational effects of being too generous; that is, the 
ratings agencies must maintain credibility to generate repeat business.  
Rising Loss Severity Increases the Incentive to Modify Loans 
Loss severity on subprime loans has reached 45 percent.  According to a study by 
Standard and Poor’s, loss severity on a subprime mortgage has reached 45%.
29  A loss 
severity of this magnitude makes it a prudent decision to recast the subprime mortgage if 
the savings from avoiding default outweighs the cost of reducing the interest rate on the 
loan. Unfortunately, there are a large number of investors in the subprime market, so loan 
modifications as a means to avoid foreclosure can vary dramatically across borrowers, 
Loan modifications as a course of action. In order to minimize losses, the servicer on a 
loan (the party to whom the mortgage payment is sent and the party that monitors the 
performance of the loan) can recast or change the terms of the mortgage loan. For 
example, the servicer can extend the loan (e.g., 300 months remaining extended out to 
360 months remaining in order to lower mortgage payments), lower the mortgage interest 
rate, or convert the loan to a different, lower risk product (e.g., adjustable-rate to fixed-
rate mortgage). The problem becomes more complex if the loan has been sold to an 
investor since the servicer is charged with operating in the best interest of the investor. 
So, the question is as follows: would the investor (or financial institution) be better off 
keeping the loan terms as is and suffering the default and subsequent loss severity or 
modifying the loan terms in order to avoid a default. 
Short sales as an alternative to loan modifications.  If loan modification is not 
possible, another approach potentially available to the borrower is the “short sale,” Since 
a typical foreclosure can result in a loss severity of 45%, a lender may be willing to settle 
for an amiable settlement by having the borrower sell the house and give the proceeds to 
the servicer. While the investor (lender) still suffers the loss of the house price, it avoids 
the other costs of foreclosure such as interest expense, property taxes, legal fees, and 
maintenance that would result from a prolonged foreclosure. Often, the borrower asks the 
servicer/lender not to enter the short sale as a default since this would destroy the 
borrower’s credit score.  Lenders generally only agree with such a course of action if the 
                                                 
29 http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.article/4,5,5,1,1204835910066.html 
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borrower is destined to default. There are a variety of circumstances where the borrower 
is destined to default such as job loss, job transfer and medical issues.  
 
 
4. Regulation of Subprime Lending and Securitization  
The Importance of Systemic Effects  
Most market observers and participants failed to anticipate the threat to system 
stability that subprime lending posed. In the words of the IMF (2008), there was a 
collective failure to appreciate the extent of leverage taken on by a wide range of 
institutions. Subprime lending has been a relatively small part of overall U.S. mortgage 
lending, rising to 20 percent of mortgage lending for its peak years of 2005 and 2006, but 
averaging 7 percent between 1994 and 2007, and ending up at about 12 percent of 
outstanding mortgages by 2006 (Inside Mortgage Finance, 2008). The subprime 
mortgages with the highest default rate were predominately made by non-depository 
lenders and sold to sophisticated institutional investors that were expected to understand 
and manage risk. Aside from the failure of investors to exercise due diligence, there was 
only a limited understanding on any observer’s part  of the cumulative extent of leverage 
within financing structures, at hedge funds, and in offshore investment vehicles created 
by banks outside the U.S.  
Before systemic effects began to be felt in 2006, the regulatory debate in the U.S. was 
limited to protecting unwary borrowers and traditionally underserved groups from lenders 
that charge exorbitant fees or that provide unsuitably risky loan products (GAO 2004, 
OCC 2006, Gramlich 2007).
 Until the crisis, there had been no consideration of the 
compounded effect of leverage and term mismatch taken on by foreign investment funds, 
such as the SIV set up in Ireland by the German Landesbank Sachsen LB, that financed 
medium and long term CDOs with short term commercial paper. There has not been a 
broad understanding of the exposure of banks to hedge funds such as the Carlyle Capital 
Corporation, the mortgage fund that failed in March, 2008.
30 These funds depended on 
bank debt to leverage their investments and increase their return on capital. 
Non-Depository Mortgage Lenders Weakened Their Underwriting Standards 
Lightly regulated non-bank financial companies linked weak subprime credit 
underwriting with international capital markets. The majority of the riskier adjustable 
rate subprime loans were originated by non-bank mortgage bankers and brokers that 
originated the loans for securitization, frequently referred to as the “originate to 
distribute” model. Mian and Sufi (2008) show that the growth in supply of mortgages by 
non-bank lenders under the originate to distribute model was associated with a decline in 
underwriting standards and an eventual rise in defaults. The resulting securities were sold 
to institutional investors, primarily private hedge funds and other asset managers for the 
riskiest structured credit products. Monoline credit insurers provided credit enhancements 
                                                 
30 Carlyle Group’s mortgage investment fund Carlyle Capital Corporation failed in March, 2008. 
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to subprime securitization transactions, and have suffered significant erosion in capital as 
defaults rose. Mortgage bankers and brokers are not subject to prudential supervision. As 
private investment firms, hedge funds have no disclosure requirements, and insurers 
generally face different capital standards than do banks.  
Where non-bank mortgage lenders have been created, including in the U.S. Mexico, 
and Asia, it has been thought unnecessary to supervise them. Since mortgage brokers 
and bankers are funded in the capital markets, it has been expected that their debt and 
equity investors should be expected to understand and manage risk. When they are a 
small part of the financial system, mortgage brokers and financial companies do not pose 
a threat to stability. With this approach in mind, the Mexican government in 2005 
clarified the regulation of non-bank lenders, creating a new and more flexible entity in 
law that permits a wider range of activities.
31 Similarly, prior to the 1998 Asian crisis, 
non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) lacked supervision, and their lending for real 
estate, margin loans for equity, consumer finance and car purchases were an important 
source of risk. The erosion of the distinction between banks and NBFIs led to 
compromise in credit underwriting criteria, with the finance company affiliates of banks 
extending credit that the banks were precluded from extending, due to prudential norms, 
such as legal lending limits (Pomerleano, 2002).  
In the U.S., non-bank mortgage lenders take two forms: mortgage banks and 
mortgage brokers. Non-bank mortgage lenders are uncommon in emerging markets, 
generally because they lack the means to either sell loans or to fund long term mortgages 
on their balance sheets.
32 Mortgage banks accumulate portfolios of loans and sell them to 
depository lenders or to securitization companies. Mortgage banks finance the 
accumulation of portfolios with short term lines of credit from commercial banks. 
Historically, the business model for a mortgage bank was to originate loans for sale to 
Fannie Mae and eventually, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae.
33 But these enterprises only 
buy loans that adhere to their credit quality standards. The mortgage banker retained the 
right to service the loan, and made most of its profits from the stream of servicing fees, as 
much as 25 basis points per loan per year. In the 1980s nad 1990s, economies of scale in 
servicing led to increased specialization, and smaller mortgage bankers increasingly sold 
their servicing rights to larger servicers that could more efficiently exploit investments in 
computer systems and customer call centers.  
Mortgage brokers have a different business model. They act as sales agents for lenders. 
Brokers never own the loans that they originate; they simply identify borrowers and 
process the application on behalf of the lender that they represent. Once the actual lender 
approves a loan for a mortgage broker client, the broker collects a fee and has no further 
stake in the loan’s performance.  
                                                 
31 In Mexico, non-bank lenders are called Limited Object Financial Companies, or by their Spanish 
acronym SOFOL. Sofols exist to make credits for cars, appliances, leases, commercial credits, and 
mortgages. The 2002 reform created a more flexible legal entity, a Multiple Object Financial company, or 
SOFOM. Neither SOFOLs nor SOFOMs are subject to prudential regulation.  
32 On the other hand,  non-bank consumer and commercial lenders are relatively common. 
33 Freddie Mac was created in 1970. Ginnie Mae securitizes mortgages that benefit from FHA mortgage 
default insurance. 
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Since investors did not insist on underwriting standards, the originate-to-sell model 
led to riskier subprime lending. Enforcing strict underwriting standards is labor 
intensive and expensive, especially for mortgage brokers that operate on thin profit 
margins. Adhering to strict underwriting reduces the volume of loans. A lender that 
enforces strict standards necessarily denies credit to some applicants.  
In theory, non-bank lenders have four incentives to maintain high underwriting 
standards:  
a)  Lenders that originate to sell need to maintain a reputation for originating high 
quality loans or they are not able to sell them. During the subprime boom, this 
incentive was weakened as investors accepted increasingly risky collateral, such 
as no-documentation loans. At the same time, the practice of paying yield spread 
premiums to brokers provided them with an incentive to maximize the interest 
rate charged on the loan. 
b)  Investment banks and security investors traditionally monitored samples of loan 
portfolios and rejected loans that failed to meet standards. However, such “due 
diligence” broke down as investors demonstrated a willingness to buy any 
collateral so long as the yield was sufficiently high. Investment banks either 
performed due diligence reviews themselves or hired firms to undertake the 
reviews for them. One of these firms, Clayton Holdings, has agreed to cooperate 
with New York state prosecutors in lawsuits against the investment banks that 
hired them. According to press reports, Clayton Holdings has told prosecutors that 
starting in 2005, it saw a significant deterioration of lending standards and a 
parallel jump in lending exceptions that were permitted, and that some investment 
banks directed it to reduce the number of loans it evaluated in each portfolio 
(NYT, 2008). Engel and McCoy (2007), provides the following language from a 
prospectus for a Merrill Lynch subprime issue:  
With the exception of approximately 20.82 percent of the mortgage loans in the 
statistical mortgage pool that were underwritten in accordance with the underwriting 
criteria of The Winter Group, underwriting criteria are generally not available with 
respect to the mortgage loans. In many instances the mortgage loans in the statistical 
mortgage pool were acquired by Terwin Advisors LLC from sources, including 
mortgage brokers and other non-originators, that could not provide detailed 
information regarding the underwriting guidelines of the originators. 
For 80 percent of the loans in this pool, no information was available that would 
allow the investor or the credit rating agency to quantitatively judge the default 
probability or expected loss given default. Nevertheless, the pool went to market 
as collateral for a rated security. 
c)  Mortgage bankers are required to repurchase loans that default too quickly, for 
instance before the first or second payment is due, or that are defective or 
fraudulent in their documentation. Mortgage bankers are required to maintain 
accounting reserves against repurchases. However, the small reserves that they 
maintained in practice proved entirely insufficient against the wave of repurchase 
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demands that surfaced as early payment defaults rose in 2006 and 2007.
34 These 
demands forced many mortgage banks into bankruptcy.   
d)  Traditional MI provided a third party quality control of the credit underwriting 
process. Lenders and investment banks bypassed this role by using simultaneous 
second liens at origination, by structuring the securitization with deeper 
subordination, and by purchasing credit enhancements from monoline insurers. 
But these substitutes included no third party review of the loan documents  
Non-bank lenders dependent solely upon securitization found themselves unable to 
sell their loans once the crisis hit. The lack of funding diversity is most pressing for 
non-depository lenders that depend solely on securitization or portfolio sales. As the 
subprime crisis grew in 2007, issuance and trading in subprime and prime mortgage-
backed securities stopped for months at a time as investors fled the sector in its entirety. 
Major lenders, such as Northern Rock in Great Britain and Countrywide Financial in the 
U.S., suffered serious liquidity shortages even though neither was primarily a subprime 
lender.
35 Although each had thousands of high quality loans in its pipeline ready for sale, 
they could not find buyers. Eventually, Northern Rock was acquired by the Bank of 
England. Since Countrywide had as a part of its assets a Federally-chartered thrift, it was 
able to tap lines of credit at the Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta. Even this proved 
inadequate, and eventually Countrywide also was required to sell itself to a larger 
commercial bank with greater resources, Bank of America.  
Consumer Protection Failures in Subprime Lending 
Many subprime borrowers had good enough credit scores to be considered prime, 
but took out loans with features that made them subprime. Foote, et al (2008) report 
that in New England, the fraction of subprime borrowers with a FICO score greater than 
620, a widely accepted cutoff for subprime, rose from 40 percent in 1999 to 70 percent in 
2004, and that the portion of high-FICO score subprime borrowers rose in nationwide 
datasets over the same period. However, at the same time, other risk measures, such as 
rising LTVs and DTIs deteriorated for these same borrowers. Some high-FICO score 
borrowers may have been inappropriately steered to subprime products, but others would 
have had to take out subprime loans if they were to take advantage of riskier loan 
features. 
Predatory subprime lenders have misled borrowers and convinced them to take out 
loans that they did not understand or that carried inappropriate risks. Statistics 
show subprime borrowers to be higher risk than prime borrowers, to pay more for loans, 
to be predominately minority, to have lower income, be less well financially educated, 
                                                 
34 For a detailed exploration of the inadequacy of such reserves, see the Final Report of the Bankruptcy 
Examiner in the New Century Bankruptcy case.  
35As defined in the U.S., there was very little subprime lending in Great Britain, and Northern Rock was 
predominately a prime lender. Between 2001 and 2006, about 10 percent of the loans that Countrywide 
originated were subprime.  
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and less likely to search for the best interest rates and terms for their mortgage loans.
36 In 
an attempt to comply with underwriting rules, some brokers persuaded borrowers to mis-
state income or assets, or convinced borrowers to sign blank application documents that 
the broker would later fill in with false figures that would be sufficient to have the loan 
approved. In one FTC case, a subprime lender presented the loan in Spanish for Spanish-
speaking borrowers, but provided documentation in English that the borrower was unable 
to read, and that was materially different from the oral promises made about the loans. A 
commonly cited practice has been “fee packing”, where excessive processing fees are 
included in the balance of the new loan, increasing the borrower’s indebtedness without 
providing value. About 70 percent of subprime loans carry prepayment fees, compared to 
about 2 percent of prime loans. Other practices include charging rates of interest much 
higher than those charged for other borrowers with similar credit histories, misleading 
borrowers about the costs of the loan by failing to disclose the costs of required taxes and 
insurance, and abuses in servicing, such as refusing to correctly credit payments received 
and then declaring borrowers to be in default. (Tomkin, et al., 2002, Lax, et al., 2004, 
GAO, 2004a, FTC 2007, Renuart, 2004.) 
Penalties for predatory lending are small in comparison to the potential gains for 
lenders. The penalty which lenders face when found guilty of breaking fair lending laws 
is to return excessive fees or charges to the affected consumers. There are no punitive 
damages in law for predatory lending practices. The FTC has played the predominant 
Federal role in enforcing fair mortgage lending laws,
37 bringing 21 actions between 1998 
and 2006 against subprime lenders, resulting in $320 million returned to consumers 
(FTC, 2007). While an significant amount, it pales in comparison to the $516.3 billion of 
subprime loans outstanding at the end of 2006, and the $117.8 billion in subprime-related 
losses experienced the same year (IMF 2008). Bringing fair lending cases is expensive 
for the agencies involved. FTC and Department of Justice (DOJ) staffs have stated that 
the cost and years of litigation involved require them to carefully select the cases most 
likely to result in the most impact (GAO, 2004). It is likely that at least some cases that 
warranted prosecution have not been pursued.   
Industry lobbying and regulatory turf issues helped to prevent tightening of 
consumer protection laws for subprime lending until the crisis became evident.  In 
the early 2000s, calls to tighten federal regulations or to pass new national legislation 
were met with indifference on some parts and by strong counter lobbying by the lending 
industry (WSJ, 2007a). Authorities at the Federal Reserve Board ignored warnings by 
one of its governors and by consumer groups. Attempts to encourage the industry in 2001 
and 2002 to have subprime lenders adopt a voluntary code of best practices were fruitless 
                                                 
36 Access to credit should be predicated on an objective assessment of ability and willingness to pay. Prior 
to the passage of anti-discrimination laws and court cases in the 1970s and 1980s, racial criteria unrelated 
to creditworthiness played an explicit role in mortgage credit allocation in the U.S. Some racial 
discrimination persists. However, in recent years much of the racial disparity in access to mortgage lending 
and in mortgage costs has reflected differences in credit scores, which carry no racial information (Federal 
Reserve, 2007). Lower credit scores reflect broader issues of social equity, such as access to education and 
employment.  
37 Other responsible agencies include the Departments of Justice (DOJ), and Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 
Each has brought some cases against subprime lenders for deceptive and discriminatory practices. 
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(WSJ, 2007b). According to data from public disclosure records, the mortgage industry 
contributed more than $271 million on federal lobbying and $24.6 million in PAC 
donations between 1999 and 2007 (Common Cause, 2007). Industry-sponsored 
legislation was introduced in 2000 and reintroduced in 2003 and 2005 to weaken 
consumer protection requirements.
38 The industry-sponsored bill languished when one of 
its Congressional supporters was jailed on corruption charges. Legislation supported by 
consumer advocates was introduced in 2005. It would have tightened subprime reporting 
rules, but it failed to gain support in the Congress.
39  
State government attempts to restrict subprime lending in their states instigated a 
strong negative reaction from national government and from the mortgage lending 
industry. Given persistent concerns about subprime lending practices and the limited 
impact of Federal law, by January, 2007, a total of 27 states had passed new laws, 
according to the lending industry (Butera and Andrews 2006). The industry lobbied state 
legislatures to weaken the laws they passed, arguing that it would be uneconomic to work 
in an environment of inconsistent state rules. The OCC, in a decision upheld by Federal 
courts, exempted all national banks and their subsidiaries from adherence to state 
predatory lending laws.
40  
The Fragmented U.S. Regulatory System Contributed to the Slow Regulatory 
Response 
The U.S. financial regulatory system permits mortgage lenders to move risk to 
where capital charges are lowest and regulatory scrutiny is lightest.  The system has 
evolved over the years into a complex and fragmented collection of national and state 
agencies with competing and overlapping mandates.
41  Regulatory responsibility of the 
separate agencies reflects institution type, since distinct financial institutions used to be 
responsible for distinct financial products. There is one supervisor for banks that once 
were specialized mortgage lenders, and another for traditional commercial banks. 
However, such institutional distinctions disappeared in the 1980s and 1990s with 
liberalization of the financial system. The result is that a given economic activity such as 
mortgage lending may be the subject of disparate regulatory treatment as a result of the 
choice that an entrepreneur makes when registering as a national bank, state bank, or as a 
non-bank lender. Other regulatory activities are split across agencies. The agency that has 
                                                 
38
 The Responsible Lending Act, H.R. 1295, 2005, introduced by Congressmen Bob Ney (R-OH) and Paul E. 
Kanjorski (D-PA) was supported by the Mortgage Bankers Association and industry lobbyists such as Butera & 
Andrews. It would have reduced the interest rate threshold for defining a subprime loan, but allowed lenders to exclude 
single premium credit insurance from the costs counted towards the fee threshold. Ney was jailed in 2006 in connection 
with improper lobbying payments unrelated to the mortgage industry. 
39 
H.R. 1182 The Prohibit Predatory Lending Act was introduced by Congressmen Brad Miller (D-NC), Mel Watt (D-
NC), and Barney Frank (D-MA). Among other things, it would have expanded the scope of HOEPA to cover purchase 
money loans and open-end loans, and set the APR threshold at 5 percent. 
40 12 CFR Parts 7 and 34, [Docket No. 04–04], RIN 1557–AC73, February 12, 2004. 
41 Many observers and many of the U.S. financial regulatory system’s leaders have described it as excessively complex 
and fragmented. A working group headed by the Secretary of the Treasury has called for the system’s restructuring and 
simplification. A General Accounting Office 2004 report called for simplification (GAO 2004b). Major deregulation of 
the financial industry started with the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act Of 1980 
(DIDMCA). Among other things, DIDMCA eliminated controls over depository interest rates, pre-empted state usury 
limits on mortgage interest rates, and eliminated most restrictions on the lending products that banks could offer.  
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primary responsibility for writing consumer protection rules for mortgage lending (the 
Federal Reserve Board) is not the same as the agency that primarily enforces them (the 
Federal Trade Commission).  
One paradoxical result of the structure of the U.S. regulatory system is that while the 
largest and safest lenders are subject to sophisticated and intrusive risk-based supervision, 
riskier non-bank mortgage lenders are subject to no prudential oversight. For instance, the 
San Francisco-based bank Wells Fargo & Co. alone has 34 examiners from the OCC and 
the equivalent of 12 Federal Reserve examiners assigned to it. By comparison, state 
regulators of mortgage brokers have limited scope and resources. California’s 
Department of Corporations has 25 examiners to oversee more than 4,800 state-licensed 
mortgage lenders, including many of the U.S.’s largest subprime companies.
 42   
The Role of Auditors 
External auditors abetted the boom mentality by under-reporting risks and losses. 
In the case of New Century Financial Corporation, New Century’s auditor, KPMG 
apparently enabled significant improper and imprudent practices related to loan 
originations, operations, accounting, and financial reporting processes. Among other 
actions, KPMG apparently suggested reducing reserves against possible loan repurchases 
in 2006 at the same time that early payment defaults rose, and New Century was 
“flooded” with repurchase claims from investors. The examiner indentified accounting 
issues with the allowance for loan losses on loans held for investment, mortgage 
servicing rights, deferral and amortization of loan origination fees, hedge accounting, and 
goodwill from an acquisition. In the third quarter of 2006, as a result of these accounting 
failures, New Century was said to have understated its repurchase reserve by 1000 
percent, reported a profit of $63.5 billion, and met analysts earnings expectations, when it 
should have reported a loss and at least a 40 percent decline in earnings per share (New 
Century Examiner Report, 2008).  
The Role of Credit Rating Agencies 
The widespread downgrading of subprime securities in 2007 severely undermined 
market confidence in the ratings process and in market prices for those securities. 
The role and supervision of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) has been an issue for some 
years in a number of financial markets (Partnoy, 2006). As noted by the IOSCO (2008), 
the growing volume of subprime securitizations gave the rating agencies little incentive 
to discourage investors from effectively outsourcing their evaluation. Regulatory 
requirements for investors, issuers, and banks, including in particular the Basel II capital 
accords, require authorities to accept the role of rating agencies on a much larger scale 
than has been the case in the past. However, in several important instances, ratings have 
lagged market developments, and have appeared out of touch with defaults, as in the case 
of Enron. In the wake of the financial scandals of 2000-2002, among a number of other 
financial market reforms, Congress requested that the Securities and Exchange 
                                                 
42 Wall Street Journal, March, 2007. 
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Commission (SEC) review the role of CRAs and their oversight.
43 By 2007, the SEC had 
finalized new regulations that established clearer standards for the recognition of CRAs. 
IOSCO has developed a code of conduct for CRAs, and published several studies on its 
implementation.
44  
Basel II Capital Accords Would Have a Limited Effect on the Subprime Boom and 
Crisis  
Basel II was not in effect in the U.S. during the subprime boom, and it does not 
apply to non-bank lenders. Basel II Pillar 1 capital standards primarily affect mortgage 
lending in three respects: 1) lower risk weights for mortgages retained on bank balance 
sheets in countries where lower losses can be demonstrated, 2) lower risk weights for 
loans backed by mortgage default insurance, and 3) specific capital requirements for bank 
investments in mortgage-related securities. Pillar 3 of Basel II requires banks to provide 
qualitative discussions of securitizations and off balance sheet exposures, representing a 
limited improvement, given the qualitative nature of the requirements (IMF, 2008,). Pillar 
2 requires supervisors to review the quality of these disclosures. The more advanced 
Basel II internal ratings based standards will be implemented between 2008 and 2011 by 
large, internationally active banks in the U.S., and so were not in effect during the growth 
of subprime lending at the beginning of the decade.
45 The Basel II accords do not apply 
to non-bank lenders, to investment banks, or to CRAs.  
Although the U.S. has arguably one of the most transparent financial markets in the 
world, market discipline was of little use in reining in the subprime boom or 
preventing the crisis. Offering documents provide summary descriptions of key 
collateral performance indicators.
46 Risky subprime-backed securities were sold only to 
sophisticated institutional investors, not to individuals. Investors depended excessively on 
agency ratings for assurance that the bonds would pay, rather than conducting their own 
analysis. Investors apparently felt that the yields offered by subprime securities 
compensated for the risks they were taking (Jaffee, 2008). While they are a crucial part of 
efficient and stable financial systems, market disclosures were insufficient to prevent 
subprime excesses. The short term earnings incentives from fees and the strong demand 
for higher yield paper created a race to the bottom with respect to credit underwriting 
rules and leverage. Individual market participants maximized their short term individual 
utility in the form of fee income and issuance volume, while ignoring the longer term 
system-wide effects of higher defaults and leverage. 
Lenders and CRAs abandoned industry best practice for the employment of 
econometric models for default and loss. The reliance on rating agency default and loss 
models for pricing and trading subprime securities has been a central controversy in the 
subprime crisis (IMF, 2008, PWG, 2008, Jaffee, 2008). At the beginning of the boom, 
subprime lending was a new asset class, and so the rating agency and lender default 
                                                 
43 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 702(b), 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
44 www.iosco.org 
45 See www.frb.com for the U.S. mplementation schedule, www.bis.org for the overall schedule and for 
separate countries’ decisions regarding their implementation. 
46 See Engel and McCoy (2007), as cited above.  
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models only had performance data for a limited population of borrowers during a 
property boom, when rising collateral values masked credit risk. Basel II will permit 
sophisticated banks in developed markets to set reserves and capital for retained 
mortgages using historical statistics on their expected default frequency and loss given 
default. But this methodology can be reasonably extended only to markets that have 
developed data sets that span full credit cycles.
47 Were the Basel II standards for internal 
ratings applied to subprime lending, lenders would have been required to show that they 
had at least five years of data on the performance of subprime loans made to target 
lending groups before they would receive preferential capital treatment. In contrast, the 
CRAs began giving triple-A ratings to pools of option ARM loans in 2000, even though 
there had been few such loans made to moderate income subprime borrowers. The 
inaccuracy of rating agency subprime default expectations only highlights the importance 
of moving carefully to the adoption of statistical models in markets that lack historical 
data.  
To the degree that Basel II raises the cost of holding risk on a bank’s balance sheet, 
banks will look for ways to shift risk to where it is cheaper to hold it. U.S. and 
international accounting standards permitted the use of off-balance sheet treatment of 
large financial operations with limited transparency to investors and regulators (IMF, 
2008). The use of lightly-regulated non-bank lending subsidiaries and the creation of off-
balance sheet SIVs reflects relative capital and disclosure costs. Basel II addresses the use 
of SIVs and securitization with its Pillar 1 rules for true sale and recourse, and Pillar 3 
rules for qualitative disclosure of securitization transactions.  
 
5. Observations and Recommendations for Emerging Markets 
Broadly speaking, there has been no subprime mortgage lending in emerging 
markets. Instead, mortgage lending is typically made on conservative terms to middle 
and upper income households employed in the formal sector:  
•  Most emerging market households handle their economic lives in cash, lack bank 
accounts, and few have access to credit. Bank branches are concentrated in wealthier 
urban areas and their products are targeted at upper income earners. Surveys in India, 
Pakistan, Colombia, and Mexico show between 170 and 440 savings accounts per 
1,000 people, versus between 970 and 2,400 per 1,000 people in developed countries. 
Loan accounts in India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan range between 30 and 80 per 1,000 
people, versus between 250 and 775 in developed countries.
48  
•  Consumer finance markets are relatively small in emerging markets. Consumers tend 
to carry less debt than do their developed country counterparts, and they often prepay 
                                                 
47 Or, at least five years of performance data, per Basel II. This is unlikely to span a full real estate credit 
cycle. For example, the subprime boom period extended from 2000 to 2006, and the bust period has just 
begun. After its 1980s real estate boom, the bottom of the cycle in Japan lasted more than ten years, 
referred to by some observers as the lost decade. 
48 REF A2F sources, Jayamaha; Caskey, et al 2006. 
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mortgage debt as rapidly as possible. In recent years, the household debt-to-GDP ratio 
for European accession countries was 12 percent, Thailand’s was 29 percent, those of 
Hong Kong, South Korea and Malaysia, ranged between 60 and 65 percent, and the 
U.S. rose to 107 percent (Fitch, 2007, BIS, 2008, Coricelli, et al, 2008). Thirty-nine 
percent of Thailand’s Government Housing Bank mortgage borrowers are civil 
servants, and 50 percent are employed in the formal private sector (Fitch, 2007). 
Partial prepayments in Colombia in the early part of the 2000s ran at 8 percent per 
year, as consumers sought to retire inflation-indexed mortgages as quickly as 
possible.
49 
•  Given the overall lack of access to credit, and the relatively high cost of registering 
and enforcing a mortgage lien, emerging market banks have been slow to move down 
market with mortgages. Mortgage lending is typically less than 20 percent of GDP in 
emerging markets, while it ranges between 40 and 100 percent of GDP in developed 
countries. (Chart 5.) 
•  Mortgage credit in emerging markets carries relatively low LTVs and short 
maturities. LTVs in China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and Korea range between 70 and 
80 percent (Zhu, 2006). LTVs at origination in Mexico range between 60 to 80 
percent and only recently were permitted to rise to 90 percent.
50  Loan maturities for 
nominal local currency loans in Mexico, Peru, and China run typically between 10 
and 15 years.
51  
•  Since the macroeconomic crises of the late 1990s, low interest rates, low inflation, 
and financial sector reforms have caused mortgage default rates to fall dramatically. 
In Thailand, NPLs on housing loans dropped from 30 percent in 2000 to 7.6 percent 
at the end of 2006 (Fitch, 2007).  Default rates in Mexico fell from 33 percent in 1998 
to 3.2 percent in 2005 (BBVA, 2008). In India, 90 day delinquency rates range 
between 2.7 and 6.8 percent, as a function of the LTV ratio (Government Housing 
Bank). 
•  Many emerging mortgage markets lack long term funding tools such as covered 
bonds and securitization that permit lenders to extend the maturity of their loans. In 
East Asia, the first MBS were issued in China, Hong Kong, and Singapore within the 
past four years (BIS, 2006). Within Latin America, active large scale mortgage 
securitization markets have emerged only in Mexico, Colombia, and Chile (BBVA, 
2008), and only Chile has a widespread covered bond market. 
                                                 
49 Source: Author interviews with Titularizadora Colombiana. 
50 Source: Author interviews with Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal. 
51 In the case of Mexico and Peru, this refers to loans without inflation indexing.  
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Chart 5 
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Emerging financial markets have been damaged by losses from opaque off-balance 
sheet entities. Weaker reporting regimes reduce market discipline. For instance, 
Guatemala’s Bancafe failed in 2006 as a result of levered investments by an offshore unit 
based in Barbados (Fitch, 2007).
 In transition countries, including Russia and Poland, 
domestic legal shortcomings have led banks to securitize leases and mortgages using 
offshore vehicles under the laws of other countries, such as Great Britain and the 
Netherlands. To the degree that any of these securitizations permit recourse to the issuing 
institution, the domestic financial systems may bear more risk than is widely understood.  
Smaller economies have relied on foreign capital to fund growth in domestic 
financial markets. These countries have suffered in the international credit crunch, as 
international investors fled to high quality government bonds from large economies, 
including Europe, and somewhat ironically, the United States. Kazakh banks incurred 
external debt worth 46 percent of GDP by the end of June 2007, then saw their access to 
international capital markets curtailed two months later as a result of the international 
credit crunch. The government has had to tap its reserve funds to help banks to meet 
foreign currency commitments and maintain liquidity in the banking system. Other 
countries without Kazakhstan’s oil wealth lack the capacity to compensate against such 
exposures (Fitch, 2007). 
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Housing policies for low and moderate income groups should not be excessively 
weighted towards owner-occupied solutions. Households with low and uncertain 
incomes may be better off renting than owning housing that meets standards for health 
and safety. If subsidies are provided, they should be available for either ownership (for 
example with down payment assistance) or rental (for instance with rental vouchers), and 
in either case for new or used units. There should be balanced protections in law for 
mortgage lenders and borrowers, and for rental landlords and tenants. Tax treatment 
should not unduly favor owning or renting.  
The challenge for emerging markets is to increase access to housing finance for 
moderate and low income households while maintaining strong standards for credit 
risk management. Governments can reduce the cost of housing by increasing efficiency 
in land markets. Banks may increase the supply and maturity of mortgages by financing 
themselves with covered bonds or by securitizing portfolios. They may extend credit to 
lower income households by employing more labor-intensive microfinance management 
methods. Emerging market lenders can extend credit to moderate income households 
using alternative documentation methods and credit scoring technology while 
maintaining strong credit underwriting standards.  
Primary Market Practices  
Maintain standards for risk-based pricing, credit underwriting, capital and reserve 
retention during the full real estate market cycle. While market disclosures are crucial 
to the operation of efficient and fair markets, they proved inadequate to prevent the 
subprime crisis. When a market boom creates disincentives to maintain origination 
standards, financial regulators need to enforce credit underwriting and risk management 
requirements for all lenders and for capital market participants. Lenders should avoid 
excessive reliance on credit scores, rather use them as a complement to traditional 
underwriting methods. Basic elements for mortgages include an equity contribution by 
the borrower, verification and documentation of willingness and ability to pay, and 
industry standards for appraisal methodology.  
Evaluate mortgage credit risk in terms of the borrower’s income, not the value of 
the property. Even though mortgages are secured with a lien on a house, collecting 
mortgage debt by foreclosing on the house generally results in a loss to the lender, 
especially when house prices are flat or falling. However, as the recent boom persisted, 
lenders came to rely increasingly on expected house price increases rather than borrower 
income. At the same time, lenders became increasingly tolerant of very high loan-to 
value ratios (LTVs) without income verification or credit enhancements. (Demyanyk and 
Van Hemert 2007, Gramlich 2007, various OCC guidances.)  
The primary means to evaluate the capacity to pay is the borrower’s debt-to-income 
ratio. It may be expressed either in terms of monthly housing payment to monthly 
income gross of taxes, or total monthly obligations (mortgage and other consumer debt) 
divided by monthly gross income. For prime mortgage loans in the U.S., the standard for 
mortgage debt to gross income is 28 percent for monthly housing payment to gross 
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income and 36 percent for total debt obligations to gross income.
52 For subprime lending, 
the mortgage payment to income ratio was allowed to range much higher, averaging 41 
percent in 2006, and in some cases exceeding 50 percent (Fitch, 2007).  
To evaluate the debt to income ratio adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), the lender 
should estimate the affordability at a fully-adjusted rate of interest. This requires 
assessing at the time of origination the borrower’s ability to pay at the fully indexed rate, 
ignoring any artificial discounts and taking into account predictable near term 
adjustments. In originating 2/28 and 3/27 ARMs, debt-to-income analysis was generally 
done only with the teaser rate, and no evaluation of the affordability of the fully adjusted 
rate was conducted.
53 In many cases, there was an expectation at the time the loan was 
made that the borrower would refinance to another, better loan before the adjustment 
point was reached. ARMs with periodic and lifetime caps on rate adjustment can be a 
useful product for lower and moderate income borrowers when correctly underwritten. 
Allow flexibility in sound credit management practices while increasing access for 
low and moderate income borrowers. Lenders should be required to document 
borrower income, but be allowed flexibility with respect to the means by which informal 
income earners establish their ability to pay. This can include structured savings 
programs, rent and utility receipts, and co-signatures by friends and family members. 
Mexican lenders have developed proprietary credit scoring systems. Half of the mortgage 
lending in recent years funded by Mexico’s Federal Mortgage Company (known by its 
Spanish language acronym SHF) via non-bank lenders has reached households earning 
between the median and 70
th percentile, a significant improvement over previous years, 
when most lending was to households in the 70
th percentile or higher. As much as 15 
percent of non-bank lending has gone to informal sector workers. SHF also supports 
microfinance for housing and subsidy programs for households earning less than the 
median.
54  Financial products such as mortgage default insurance have contributed to the 
stable extension of mortgage credit to moderate income households in Mexico, Hong 
Kong, the U.S., Canada, and other countries. 
Prepayment fees should be limited to the actual financial cost of refinancing 
incurred by the lender or investor. Yield maintenance fees are common in many 
countries that feature long term fixed rate loans.
55 These fees eliminate the financial gain 
for the consumer from exercising the prepayment option. In some countries contractual 
limits on prepayment are the norm. Any such fees or limitations should be clearly 
disclosed to the borrower. Prepayment fees should not exceed the mark-to-market loss 
that the lender incurs as a result of prepayment. 
                                                 
52 Monthly housing payment includes principal, interest, taxes, and insurance. Total monthly obligations 
are defined as monthly housing payment plus other recurring debt obligations. 
53 See comments by consumer advocates and lenders to the 2006 Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional 
lending at www.occ.gov or www.federalreserve.gov. 
54 Sources: SHF, interviews with lenders. 
55 For example: Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden. and Australia. 
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Set LTV requirements in terms of the local history of house price movements and 
prevailing foreclosure costs. Authorities should look at the history of house prices in 
their markets to see how volatility is likely to affect the equity position of a high LTV 
loan. Countries with higher volatility will want to set the LTV standard lower than others. 
For instance, if house prices have a substantial likelihood of dropping 5 percent over a 
given 5 year period, then 95 LTV loans would be inadvisable. Rapidly urbanizing 
markets, such as China and Mexico, where valuations are based largely on new 
construction, should require lower LTVs. (In fact, China has restricted LTVs to 65 
percent in its more overheated cities.) In more mature markets, with a longer history of 
trading of both new and used housing, higher LTVs may be acceptable. Likewise, longer 
or more uncertain foreclosure periods or higher costs should drive lower LTV norms. 
As property prices rise, discount the appraised value of the collateral property. In 
rapidly rising markets, authorities should require lenders to discount the appraised valued 
of properties. Such a discount is embedded in German regulation. Mortgage lenders are 
permitted to lend on 90 percent of the appraised value (VDP 2006). Owner-occupied 
properties may be valued in relation to comparisons to prices of five similar properties, 
subject to a deduction of 10 percent as a “safety margin.” Regulators could go beyond 10 
percent in particularly volatile markets.   
Require lenders to counter-cyclically adjust loss provisions to reflect changing 
property prices. As property prices rise, regulators can require lenders to set aside more 
for expected losses from defaults. Spain has had such a dynamic provisioning rule in 
effect since 2000. Banks are required to complement the standard 0.5 percent specific 
provision for expected losses and with an additional amount that reflects “latent global 
losses.” Each quarter, banks set the statistical provision either in relation to their 
statistical default experience in each asset class, or if they lack such data, in terms of 
fixed percentages set by asset class in the regulation. The additional statistical provision 
for mortgages with an LTV of 80 percent or less is 0.1 percent (Bank of Spain, 1999). As 
described by the Bank of Spain,  
“In good times the specific provision is low and the statistical provision is positive. However, in a 
slowdown, as impaired assets rise, the specific provision requirements increase and the statistical 
provision becomes negative. This means that the statistical fund (accumulated in previous years) 
starts being used, its proceeds (the difference between the latent risk and the specific provision) 
being credited to the profit and loss account. Therefore, thanks to the mechanism of the statistical 
provision, the burden of credit risk on the profits of banking institutions is better spread over the 
cycle and more in accordance with the evolution of expected losses.”  
As a result of the dynamic provisioning rule, general provisions at Spanish banks rose by 
roughly 250 percent between 2000 and 2007, while specific provisions remained largely 
unchanged. The doubtful assets coverage ratio at Spanish banks averaged over 200 
percent of bad loans at the end of 2007, versus a European Union average of 60 percent 
(Fernández de Lis, 2008). Given the boom in Spanish property prices, 12.2 percent per 
year between 2000 and 2005, the additional provision represents a useful cushion against 
a possible market decline (van den Nord, 2006). 
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Create a public data base on property prices, mortgage interest rates, mortgage 
lending volumes, and mortgage loan performance. Confidence increases when 
investors are aware of price movements and cycles. Regulators and lenders in middle 
income countries have only recently begun to keep such data. The IMF and World Bank 
have jointly developed recommended indicators for real estate markets as part of their 
work on financial stability monitoring. These include separately reporting real estate 
lending by types of financial institutions, and creating real estate price indexes.
56 Central 
banks, financial regulators, statistical agencies, and the private sector should collaborate 
to create real estate information centers that gather and report basic data on real estate 
markets and financial activity. Such data enables property appraisers to provide more 
accurate estimates of market value. Thailand created such a center in 2004.
57 Lenders and 
mortgage insurers in Mexico have reliable data from the beginning of the 2000s, when 
the public MI product was restructured, and a few mortgage lenders began to securitize 
their portfolios, but this data reflects a period of rising house prices, similar to the boom 
experienced in the U.S. in the same period. In Colombia, data exists for mortgages that 
survived the crisis of 1998 that were securitized, and for loans that have been originated 
more recently, as the market has rebounded. But these time periods represent separate 
paradigms in terms of market circumstances, and do not lend themselves easily to 
sweeping conclusions about default probability or loss given default. In China, mortgages 
have been made only since the reforms of 1998, in a real estate boom in coastal cities, 
and loan data has not been consistently gathered across the industry. In many other 
emerging markets, lending is much less widespread, and no industry-wide data is 
collected at all.  
Prudential Regulation of Non-Depository Lenders 
Ensure that all lenders have clear incentives to mitigate credit risk. As they grow in 
importance in any economy, NBFIs should be subject to prudential supervision. The lack 
of regulation of U.S. non-bank mortgage lenders, off-balance sheet SIVs, and hedge 
funds led the system to shift capital to them during the subprime boom. As Basel II is 
implemented, banks will have a greater incentive to lay risk off to third parties. National 
authorities are now considering how to avoid regulatory arbitrage among different types 
of financial institutions (IMF, 2008). Supervision of non-bank mortgage lenders could be 
less intrusive than that of depository institutions. Rules could include less frequent 
examinations for safe lending practices, and a minimum reserve or capital rule that is 
linked to a stricter requirement to repurchase poorly underwritten mortgages. For 
example, such a requirement could extend two years after origination and cover a larger 
volume of potential repurchases than has been required in the U.S. Lenders could be 
required to retain a portion of the subordinate bonds issued as part of senior-subordinate 
structures. Non-bank lenders could be required to realize fee income over a period of 
time and as a function of the performance of the loans rather than at the time the loan is 
originated. 
                                                 
56 IMF (2006). 
57 http://www.reic.or.th/home_eng/home/default.asp 
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Implementation of Basel II should reflect local market conditions. Risk weights for 
mortgage lending should reflect local experience with default and foreclosure costs. 
Preferential weights under either the standardized or internal ratings based approach 
should reflect a long history of industry-wide data on mortgage performance. If it is not 
possible to demonstrate that mortgage lending is safer than uncollateralized lending, then 
it should carry a capital risk weight that reflects that risk. The promise of a lower risk 
weight can compel the reform of legal processes for contract enforcement. 
The institutional structure for regulation should be unified and cohesive. Every 
country has to work with its own history and political forces in structuring its regulatory 
system. No one would set out to design the system that the U.S. has today. Many 
countries have been moving towards a unified prudential regulator, along the lines of the 
United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority. Whatever the structure, there should be 
clear responsibility for a given economic activity, regardless of the institution that is 
licensed to provide it. The capital and risk management requirements for all market 
participants should be harmonized to minimize incentives to shift risk to one institution 
or another. 
Provide Robust Links to Capital Markets 
Capital market funding can take at least two forms, securitization and covered 
bonds, and many countries have created liquidity backstops. Diversity in funding 
instruments and funding sources provides lenders with choices for managing capital in 
the context of term matching, credit risk, and operational risk. Many countries have 
developed securitization or covered bonds along with second tier liquidity facilities that 
allow lenders to keep mortgages on balance sheet.
58 Spain has developed active markets 
with covered bonds and securitization as capital market tools. 
Capital market funding can be developed in the context of robust market practices.  
Authorities should assure that at some stage of the securitization process, at least one 
participant besides the loan originator reviews the documentation of loans in the 
collateral pool and assures adherence to a minimum level of credit documentation. This 
may be the investment bank that arranges the securitization, the rating agency, a 
mortgage default insurer, or a special auditor. Any third party reviewer should have clear 
mandate, incentive, and accountability that is driven by a long term perspective to 
maintain loan quality rather than a focus on production volume. Third party private or 
public sector insurers can provide the basis for an investment grade rating when data is 
lacking, as has frequently been the case.
59 
The emphasis on market discipline of Basel II Pillar 3 should be an important 
means to limit risk taken by credit risk transfer mechanisms. Regulators need to 
develop clear and comprehensive rules for disclosing the terms and extent of credit risk 
transfers and subsequent recourse or liquidity obligations, and overall risk exposures.  
                                                 
58 For instance, Malaysia, France, and the United States. 
59 For example, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and the U.S. 
      37      
Credit Rating Agencies should be subject to rules for disclosures for their activities. 
Many countries have a licensing requirement and at least a nominal oversight function for 
CRAs. Competition issues associated with CRAs are more pronounced in emerging 
markets, particularly small ones with small and illiquid capital markets. In many 
emerging markets, only one of the three major international CRAs are active, often via 
contracts with domestic economic consulting firms, or via offices in nearby countries.
60 
These local firms typically lack expertise in arcane topics like structured finance.  
As the largest CRAs have already agreed, they should adhere to the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) code of conduct. Authorities could 
establish in regulation the requirement that CRAs adhere to the IOSCO code of conduct.  
Given the role of agency ratings in regulatory standards like the Basel capital accords, 
authorities should distinguish the role of CRAs from that of financial journalists. 
Unsolicited ratings should be prohibited. CRAs should be required to provide clear 
disclosures of the methodology, data, and rationale behind ratings, upgrades, and 
downgrades. CRAs should be discouraged from rating structured transactions in the 
absence of data on the performance of the collateral. In new lending and securitization 
markets, ratings for securitized collateral that has a limited performance history can be 
supported by default and loss estimations from other countries, and supported by third 
party credit enhancements. Alternative models for ratings agency fees should be 
explored, including having investors (rather than investment banks) pay to have securities 
rated. If investors choose to pay for the rating of the securities, they should be warned 
when there is insufficient information upon which to make an informed judgment. 
Financial Reporting 
While stronger financial reporting and disclosure standards were not sufficient to 
prevent the subprime crisis, they remain crucial for improving efficiency in 
emerging mortgage markets. The failings of the New Century auditor and the 
inadequacy of reporting of off-balance sheet entities in the case of Sachsen LB serve to 
highlight the importance of reporting in all markets. To the degree that lenders securitize 
portfolios, particular attention has to be paid to the nature of transactions, whether they 
meet standards for true sale of the collateral. If issuers retain exposure to the transaction, 
the nature of the risk retained should be disclosed clearly, and the institution should hold 
reserves and capital commensurate with the risk.  
Consumer Protection in Mortgage Lending
61 
Access to finance has to be balanced with appropriate products and consumer 
protections. Moderate and lower income households are able to pay for appropriately 
designed mortgages. It is unwise to offer mortgage loan products with risky adjustment 
capacities to households that lack the resources to manage the risk. This is particularly 
the case for households with limited education and financial training that are more prone 
to make less rational choices in the face of complexity. Rental housing and carefully 
                                                 
60 For example, Fitch’s Peru’s office relies on staff from its office in Chile. Mainland China has not yet 
licensed any of the three major CRAs to operate.  
61 For a more extensive discussion of consumer protection issues see Chapter 6 in Chiquier and Lea, 2008.  
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targeted subsidies are appropriate for the lowest income groups. As a result of stronger 
underwriting the U.S. public insurance program FHA has experienced much less 
deterioration in its performance than have subprime loans. Clear disclosure and suitability 
rules should be an important part of mortgage lending.  
Consumer protection is particularly important for mortgage lending. A house 
purchase is the largest, most highly leveraged, and most complex financial transaction 
most consumers will ever undertake. A mortgage creates the burden of sizeable payments 
over extended periods, coupled with the risk of losing the primary residence should the 
burden prove too great. Housing finance contracts contain many financial options for the 
consumer (e.g., early repayment) and the lender (e.g., assignment or sale of the loan, rate 
adjustment), the values of which are extremely sensitive to changing market environment 
and the outcomes of which may impose additional risk on the consumer.  
Mortgage borrowers often fail to understand the terms of complex mortgages. In a 
2007 study of mortgage borrowers, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found that both 
prime and subprime borrowers failed to understand the costs and terms of their loans 
using existing disclosure forms (Lacko, Pappalardo, 2007). The behavioral finance 
literature shows that individuals often make irrational choices in the face of complexity.
62 
When they read loan documentation, many borrowers lack the financial training to 
understand the risks of complex adjustable loans. Some part of weak subprime 
underwriting resulted from inaccurate or incomplete disclosures to borrowers. 
Consumer protection rules should contribute to improved efficiency of the mortgage 
market, especially by addressing the market failures that lead to reduced levels of 
competition, high costs of loans, or the exclusion of consumers. The most important 
failures arise from information asymmetries between lenders and consumers; the 
heterogeneity of consumers with respect to their financial education, gender, race, and 
other factors; and transaction-cost asymmetries, which limit the ability of consumers to 
react to lender action; e.g., to an interest rate increase. 
Consumer protection rules should contribute to market stability and social 
protection: stability in the sense of avoiding over-indebtedness of borrowers, with its 
consequences for the solvency of lenders and systemic risk for the financial sector. Social 
protection is relevant in the sense of mitigating individual hardship caused by mortgage 
market outcomes.  
Consumer protection rules should provide for clear disclosures and fair 
competition, and should prohibit abusive charges. Predatory lending can have a much 
broader reach than the individual borrower. In the U.S., risky subprime lending practices 
could have been restricted much earlier by tightening existing rules on non-bank lenders. 
Arguably, this would have reduced the scale of the crisis. As they work to increase access 
to finance, authorities in emerging markets should establish clear and workable rules for 
disclosing the complete costs and risks of mortgage borrowing, and to protect consumers 
                                                 
62 For an overview of behavioral economics, see Camerer, 2003. 
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from unscrupulous lenders. Examples of disclosures include Mexico’s transparency law 
and the United Kingdom’s disclosure regulation (Box 1.).   
Consumer disclosures are important in emerging markets that issue price level 
adjusting mortgages, where the principal amount varies with inflation.
63 Credit risk 
can rise if mortgages and salaries are not indexed in the same fashion. Clear disclosures 
and explanations are required to make sure that the borrower understands how her 
mortgage payment may change over time. 
 
Box 1 
Mexico’s Law on Mortgage Disclosures  
Prior to the financial crisis of 1996, Mexican banks provided a wide variety of loan products, some with 
aggressively low initial “teaser” interest rates. The combination of such teaser rates with inflation-indexed 
principal led to a sharp rise in defaults when inflation and interest rates both rose quickly during the crisis. As a 
step towards restoring consumer confidence in the mortgage market, the government passed the Federal Law on 
Transparency and Promotion of Competition in the Guaranteed Credit Market of 2002 that standardized consumer 
disclosures for mortgage lending. The law’s mandates include:  
•  Lenders must disclose the effective interest rate, taking into account the total cost of credit, including 
interest, all fees and charges.  
•  A standard for the disclosure of contract terms, minimum contents of contracts.  
•  Loan offers must be binding for a period of 20 days. 
•  Appraisal standards and authorization of appraisers.  
The Federal housing finance agency, Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal (SHF), provides monthly comparative loan 
offer information to consumers. Lenders provide indicative loan terms and payments in clear and simple charts 
that are publicly displayed on loan office walls. 
 
The United Kingdom’s Disclosure Regulation 
Mortgage lenders became subject to regulation by the Financial Service Authority (FSA) in 2004. FSA rules for 
mortgage lending are listed in the Mortgage Conduct of Business rulebook (MCOB), a key requirement of which 
is the provision of standardized disclosure documents to consumers. These two documents, the Initial Disclosure 
Document (IDD) and the Key Facts Illustration (KFI), aim to help consumers better understand the services on 
offer and the features and risks associated with mortgages that they take out, including the affordability risks. The 
provision of these documents is mandatory. The FSA also produce a fact sheet that is not mandatory for lenders to 
distribute - "You can afford your mortgage now, but what if…?" – that is designed to inform consumers of the 
affordability risks of taking out a mortgage.  
 
The IDD provides information on the products that the lender offers, the agency that regulates the lender, contact 
information in case the consumer wishes to complain about her treatment by the lender. The KFI illustration 
details all of the interest costs and other charges that will be levied with the actual loan for which the consumer is 
applying. The fact sheet on affordability discusses the risks of mortgage lending for the consumer: the possibility 
of job loss, the dependence of adjustable rates loans on the interest rate policies of the central bank, and the types 
of fees that lenders may charge.   
 
The FSA has followed up the creation of these regulations with studies to determine the effectiveness of the 
disclosure documents on actual consumers. The overall results have been positive, although less well educated 
consumers had trouble understanding some of the percentage costs and tabular information that they disclosures 
provide. The FSA stresses that these documents should form the basis of a conversation with the consumer that 
permits them to understand the complete costs and risks of the loan. 
                                                 
63 Inflation-indexed mortgages have been prominent at different times in a number of countries, including 
Israel, Poland, Chile, Argentina, and Mexico. As inflation has fallen in recent years, shorter maturity fixed 
nominal rate loans have become popular in Colombia and Mexico.  
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